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1 Introduction 
Within cognitive linguistics, the notion of domain is central. A number of articles 
analyze the meaning of the notion: e.g., Croft (2002), Clausner and Croft (1999), 
Croft and Cruse (2004), Evans and Green (2006); but they all fall back, more or 
less, on Chapter 4 of Langacker (1987). 
Following Langacker (1987), there is a strong tendency in the literature to in-
terpret the notion of domain in an all-encompassing way. For example, Clausner 
and Croft (1999: 1) write: "although the basic constructs of 'concept', 'domain', 
'construal', and 'category structure' go by different names, they are essentially 
the same among researchers in cognitive linguistics." 1 One reason for this is that 
1 This allows them to claim that an "image schema is a subtype of domain" (Clausner and Croft 
1999: 4). 
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a key distinction in the early cognitive semantics is that between "figure" and 
"ground" that was borrowed from Gestalt psychology. A basic idea is then that the 
semantic structure for a word (or a construction) consists of both the concept (the 
figure) and its presupposed frame structure (ground). 2 In our opinion, the figure/ 
ground distinction is not appropriate in all situations and using it as a universal 
principle leads to unnecessary confusion. Our aim is to clear up some of this con-
ceptual complexity. 
In Sections 2 and 3, we critically discuss attempts to specify what is meant by 
the notion of domain. We argue that Langacker's concept of domain conflates 
several components that are invoked in the analysis of lexical meanings. In par-
ticular, we believe that his distinction between locational and configurational 
domains is misleading. His configurational domains are better seen as rneronornic 
information concerning the relation between parts and whole, rather than some-
thing pertaining to domains. 
Accordingly, in Section 4, we make a distinction between a more psychologi-
cally oriented description of domains based on dimensional structures, on the 
one hand; and one based on meronomic relations, on the other. Meronomic rela-
tions, we argue, should not be included in the description of domains. We show 
that, by adopting a dimensional approach to domains, several of the problems 
with the view of Langacker and his followers can be avoided. In particular, con-
figurational domains (Section 5) can be analyzed as higher-level dimensional 
structures. In cognitive linguistics, metaphors have been characterized as a map-
ping across domains and metonymies as involving relations within a domain. 
However, the broad use of the notion of a domain has made it difficult to apply 
this distinction. An added benefit of the distinction between dimensional do-
mains and meronomic relations (Section 6) is that it generates a natural account 
of the difference between metaphors and metonymies. 
2 Basic and abstract domains 
Langacker (1987) wants to show that meaning is based on conceptualization; his 
motivation for introducing the notion of domain is part of this program. He says 
that domains "are necessarily cognitive entities: mental experiences, representa-
tional spaces, concepts or conceptual complexes" (1987: 147). He describes a 
domain as a "context for the characterization of a semantic unit" (1987: 147). This 
is in accordance with viewing a domain as a ground in the Gestalt sense. 
2 We are grateful to William Croft for pointing this out to us. 
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The first distinction Langacker discusses concerning domains is basic vs. ab-
stract domains. He notes that the concept knuckle "presupposes" finger; which, in 
turn, depends on hand, arm, body, and, finally, space (Langacker 1987: 147-148). 
However, space cannot be defined relative to some other, more fundamental, con-
cept. This characterizes a basic domain. Langacker (1986) summarizes: 
It is however necessary to posit a number of 'basic domains,' that is, cognitively irreducible 
representational spaces or fields of conceptual potential. Among these basic domains are 
the experience of time and our capacity for dealing with two- and three-dimensional spatial 
configurations. There are basic domains associated with various senses: color space (an 
array of possible color sensations), coordinated with the extension of the visual field; the 
pitch scale; a range of possible temperature sensations (coordinated with positions on the 
body); and so on. Emotive domains must also be assumed. It is possible that certain linguis-
tic predications are characterized solely in relation to one or more basic domains, for exam-
ple time for (BEFORE), color space for (RED), or time and the pitch scale for (BEEP). How-
ever, most expressions pertain to higher levels of conceptual organization and presuppose 
nonbasic domains for their semantic characterization. (Langacker 1986: 5) 
Evans and Green (2006: 234) add that basic domains are directly tied to 
pre-conceptual embodied experience: they provide "a 'range of conceptual po-
tential' in terms of which other concepts and domains can be understood." 
Given basic domains, an abstract domain is then defined as " . .. any nonbasic 
domain, i.e. any concept or conceptual complex that functions as a domain for 
the definition of a higher-order concept" (Langacker 1987: 150). In a footnote he 
adds: "an abstract domain is essentially equivalent to what Lakoff ... terms an ... 
idealized cognitive model ... and what others have variously called a frame, 
scene, schema or even script .... " 
The problem with this general characterization, which is repeated in most 
later discussions, is that it is too inclusive: it offers no criterion for what is not a 
domain. We see this as a consequence of using the figure-ground dichotomy as a 
basis for the notion of a domain. Taylor (1989: 84) writes that" ... in principle, 
any conceptualization or knowledge configuration, no matter how simple or com-
plex, can serve as the cognitive domain for the characterization of meanings." 
The all-embracing description of domains makes the concept too vague and 
rather useless. We shall argue that it is necessary to separate meaning relations 
that are based on similarity judgments from other types of relations. We suggest a 
narrower characterization of domain based on dimensionality and argue that 
many other aspects of meaning that have been sorted under the notion rather 
concern part-whole and other meronomic relations. 
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3 Locational and configurational domains 
One of the central, but also more problematic, distinctions in Langacker's (1987) 
theory is between locational and configurational domains. This distinction has 
been copied by several other researchers: Clausner and Croft (1999: 7-13), Evans 
and Green (2006: 236), Croft and Cruse (2004: 21). 
Langacker's description is ambiguous. First he writes that a concept "can be 
characterized as a location or a configuration in a domain (or in each of a set of 
domains)". A color is locational since it can be identified with a region of color 
space, while a circle is configurational since it can be described as a configuration 
of points in the domain of two-dimensional space (Langacker 1987: 149). 
Then, he extends the terminology to domains. "A predicate specifies a loca-
tion or a configuration in a domain (or in each domain of a complex matrix). Ac-
cordingly we can speak of a domain being either locational or configurational" 
(Langacker 1987: 152). In the following paragraph he writes: "the distinction be-
tween locational and configurational domains is elusive .... A location presup-
poses some frame of reference making it possible to distinguish one location from 
another, whereas a configuration may be independent of any specific position 
within a coordinate system". An example of a configuration is a triangle that "is 
recognized as such regardless of its position and orientation within the visual 
field": i.e., he regards the visual field (physical space) as a configurational 
domain. On the other hand, color space is locational, since "changing the specifi-
cation of color sensation . .. results in a different color sensation" (Langacker 
1987: 153). 
Langacker discusses possible criteria for determining whether a domain is 
locational or configurational. He settles on the following: "what makes a domain 
configurational ... is our capacity to accommodate a number of distinct values as 
part of a single gestalt" (1987: 153). Using this criterion, he concludes that space, 
time, and pitch are configurational domains, while color is locational. 
Clausner and Croft (1999, Section 2.2) criticize this distinction, showing that 
the domains Langacker calls configurational can support both locational and 
configurational concepts: 3 space supports locational here and configurational 
circle; time supports locational now and configurational week; and pitch supports 
locational middle-C and configurational minor chord. 
Clausner and Croft take a step in the right direction when they recognize that 
"locationality vs. configurationality is a property of concepts, not domains" 
3 Langacker (personal communication) says that he does not intend the distinction between 
locational and configurational domains to be exclusive. 
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(1999: 13). We want to go further: in Section 5, we argue that, by considering 
"higher-level" domains, one sees that concepts described as configurational in 
one domain can be seen as locational in another. This means that, once a hierar-
chy of domains is introduced, the distinction loses much of its relevance. 
4 Dimensionality 
4.1 Dimensional vs. meronomic structures 
As a third theme in his presentation of domains, Langacker (1987: 150-152) ob-
serves that many domains - basic and abstract - are dimensional; but he does not 
formulate this property as a criterion of a domain. The examples Langacker and 
others give of domains can be grouped into two categories: (i) dimensional and (ii) 
meronomic (i.e., relating to part-whole relations) . Langacker's first example -
finger as the domain for knuckle, hand as the domain for finger, etc. - is a clear 
case of meronomic structure. Similarly, when he claims that no hypotenuse exists 
without a right-angled triangle (Langacker 1987: 183), this is a statement about a 
meronomic relation. We interpret Langacker's (1987) proposal to distinguish be-
tween locational and configurational domains as his attempt to characterize the 
two types of domains. Thus formulated, the distinction is misleading. 
Clausner and Croft (1999: 6) go so far as saying that" ... the concept-domain 
semantic relationship is essentially a part-whole (i.e. meronomic) relationship". 
This may only be true in a different sense for dimensional domains: as we shall 
argue later, concepts correspond to regions of dimensional domains. This is not 
normally what is meant by "a part-whole relationship". 
Another distinction is subtler. When Langacker writes that one concept pre-
supposes another, this can mean two different things. Even though a finger pre-
supposes a hand, the meronomic structure makes it possible to replace one finger 
with another, with the result still being a hand. Or, the engine of a car can be re-
placed with another and the object still remains a car. In a dimensional domain 
like color - in contrast - orange might be said to presuppose the color domain; 
but orange cannot be replaced by another color while keeping the content of the 
domain the same. Therefore, the color domain does not have a meronomic struc-
ture. It forms an integrated whole where the relations between the elements are 
central for determining the content of the domain: Orange must be a color be-
tween yellow and red, otherwise it is no longer the color domain. In economic 
terms: the parts in a meronomic structure are fungible; regions of dimensional 
domains are not. 
.. 
442 - P. Gardenfors and 5. Lohndorf DE GRUYTER MOUTON 
Meronomic relations do not occur only in the shape domain. They can be 
found in many other domains: a chord consists of three tones or more; a family, of 
parent(s) and child(ren); a limerick, of five lines; etc. 
When Langacker (1987: 183) talks about the concept arc being "profiled" 
against the "base" circle, he also uses the term domain for the base. He empha-
sizes the distinction between profile and base in many situations. However, all his 
profile/base examples involve meronomic relations. Croft (2002: 166) explicitly 
relies on the profile/base distinction in defining a domain as "a semantic struc-
ture that functions as the base for at least one concept profile." We propose to go 
the other direction and define domains in terms of dimensions. 
The dimensional domains have different semantic roles than do the mero-
nomic structures. The examples given for meronomic structures are of concepts 
expressed by nouns; thus, they refer to objects and parts of objects. Characteristi-
cally, objects have multiple attributes, while a dimensional domain only rep-
resents a single attribute. 
4.2 Domains in psychology 
We now turn to a brief description of dimensions and domains as used in cogni-
tive psychology.4 Our aim is to make the psychological notion of domain a plausi-
bly suitable tool for the aims of cognitive linguistics. Thus, we propose to unify 
the two areas. 
Psychology has a long tradition of analyzing the dimensionality of percep-
tual structures. Shepard (1987) argues that, as soon as perception relating to a 
particular domain can be graded by similarity, mathematical techniques - such 
as multidimensional scaling (Kruskal 1964) or principal component analysis -
can be used to extract a low-dimensional space representing the similarity judg-
ments. The more similar two objects are judged to be, the closer the points repre-
senting the objects will be within the space. A large number of perceptual spaces 
have been identified in this way: see e.g. (Shepard 1987: 1318).5 
We submit that everything Langacker calls a basic domain can be given a di-
mensional description. The claim must, however, be qualified: some dimensions 
are binary (e.g., gender); some are ordered structures (e.g., kinship relations); 
some have a full metric structure. 
4 Clausner and Croft (1999: 5) remark that "Langacker's notion of a domain appears to differ in 
some respects from the term domain used by most psychologists dealing with concepts." 
5 Nosofsky (1992) gives an excellent survey of different mathematical models in this area. 
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As a potential counterexample, Langacker (1987: 151) says that emotions 
cannot be characterized "in terms of a small number of essentially linear dimen-
sions. "6 However, one finds several dimensional analyses of emotions in the psy-
chological literature. Most of these (e.g., Osgood et al. 1957; Russell 1980) contain 
two basic dimensions: a value dimension, on a scale from positive to negative 
aspects of emotions; and an arousal dimension, on a scale from calm to excited 
emotional states. 7 Even though there is no one final theory of the dimensional 
structure of emotions, we do not view the emotion domain as a counterexample 
to our thesis. 
4.3 Integral and separable dimensions 
We next turn to the connection between dimensions and domains. Certain quality 
dimensions are integral: one cannot assign an object a value on one dimension 
without giving it a value on the other(s) (Garner 1974; Maddox 1992; Melara 1992). 
An object cannot be given a hue without also giving it a brightness; a sound pitch 
always goes with a certain loudness. Dimensions that are not integral are separa-
ble: e.g., the size and hue dimensions. Melara (1992) presents the distinction as 
follows: 
What is the difference psychologically, then, between interacting [integral] and separable 
dimensions? In my view, these dimensions differ in their similarity relations. Specifically, 
interacting and separable dimensions differ in their degree of cross-dimensional similarity, 
a construct defined as the phenomenal similarity of one dimension of experience with an· 
other. I propose that interacting dimensions are higher in cross-dimensional similarity than 
separable dimensions. (Melara 1992: 274) 
Using this distinction, we propose that a domain be defined as a set of inte-
gral dimensions separable from all other dimensions. The three color dimensions 
constitute a prime example of a domain in this sense: hue, chromaticness, and 
brightness are integral dimensions separable from all other quality dimensions. 
Another example is the tone domain, with the basic dimensions pitch and loud-
ness. Of course, ordinary space is also a domain, consisting of the integral dimen-
sions width, depth, and height. The most fundamental reason for decomposing a 
cognitive structure into domains is that the properties of an object can be de-
scribed independently of other properties. That an object has the weight of one 
kilo is independent of its temperature or color. 
6 Langacker's position is repeated by Green and Evans (2006: 236). 
7 Langacker (1987: 151) presents these two dimensions, too, but he does not seem to regard them 
as exhaustive. 
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4.4 Empirical criteria for integrality 
Several empirical tests have been proposed to decide whether two perceptual 
dimensions are separable or integral (see Maddox 1992). One is called speeded 
classification. The stimuli consist of four combinations of two levels of two dimen-
sions: x and y (e.g., size and hue). If the x-levels are x1 and x2 (e.g., large and small) 
and the y-values are y1 and y2 (e.g., green and yellow), one can denote the four 
stimuli (xi' y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y1), and (x2, y2). In the control condition, subjects are 
asked to categorize as quickly as possible the level of one dimension - say x -
while the other is held constant: i.e., they are presented with either the stimulus 
(xi' y1) or (x2, y1), or either the stimulus (x1, y2) or (x2, y2). In the filtering condition, 
the same subjects are asked to categorize the level of the same dimension while 
the other varies independently. If the mean reaction time in the filtering condition 
is longer than in the control condition, then the irrelevant dimension - in this 
case y - is said to interfere with the test dimension x, and the two dimensions are 
classified as integral. The assumption is that two separable dimensions can be 
attended selectively, while this is difficult for two integral dimensions. Given sep-
arable dimensions, subjects can "filter out" the irrelevant information from the 
relevant. 
Another test is the redundancy task (Garner 1974). The stimuli and the control 
condition remain the same as in the previous test; while in the redundancy con-
dition, only two of the four stimuli are used: either (xi' y1) and (x2, y2), or (x1, y2) 
and (x2, y1). The values of the two dimensions are thus correlated, so that the 
value of one allows subjects to predict the value of the other. Subjects are pre-
sented with one of the two stimuli and asked to categorize, as quickly as possible, 
the value of one dimension: e.g., x. If the mean reaction time is shorter than in the 
control condition, the subjects are said to exhibit a redundancy gain, and the two 
dimensions are classified as integral. 8 
4.5 Comparison with feature analysis 
In the philosophical tradition of semantics, it has been assumed that the mean-
ing of a word can be decomposed into a finite set of conditions that are jointly 
necessary and sufficient to describe the reference of the word. The semantic anal-
ysis based on distinctive features goes one step further and also assumes that the 
8 Gardenfors (2000: 25) presents a third test: the so-called direct dissimilarity scaling. 
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necessary and sufficient conditions can be formulated in terms of a finite number 
of semantic primitives (cf. Jackendoff1983: 112; Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994). In 
linguistics and cognitive science, these assumptions have been expressed most 
prominently by Katz (1966), Schank (1975) and Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) 
(although the latter express some reservations). 
Could it not be that the dimensions of a conceptual space can be generated 
from such a set of distinguishing features? There exist, however, a number of ex-
perimental findings that speak in favor of dimensional representations based on 
similarities in contrast to feature representations. The prototype theory of Rosch 
(1978) and her followers builds on data showing that objects can be more of less 
typical examples of a category and that there is graded membership in a category. 
These findings are difficult to explain in a theory of distinguishing features. Fur-
thermore, Smith and Medin (1981: 121-123) present three types of results that 
speak against feature analysis: (i) People can make fine discriminations about, 
for example, the size of objects, which implies that they have access to dimen-
sionalised knowledge about the corresponding concepts; (ii) multidimensional 
scaling analyses consistently reveal dimensional properties; and (iii) in percep-
tual categorizations, like in Labov's (1973) experiment with container-like ob-
jects, subjects distinguish, for example, diameter-to-height ratios that are used in 
their categorizations. Such ratios presume dimensional representations. 
Also Langacker (1987: 54) criticizes feature analysis. He argues that "a cogni-
tive domain is an integrated conceptualization in its own right, not a feature 
bundle". Similarly Jackendoff (1983: 112-122) expresses criticism. One of his ex-
amples is the concept red. Red must include the feature color, "[b]ut once the 
marker COLOR is removed from the reading of 'red', what is left to decompose 
further? How can one make sense of redness minus coloration?" (1983: 113). Thus, 
Jackendoff, like Langacker, ends up proposing irreducible integrated cognitive 
domains as a basis for semantics. 
Most accounts of distinctive features assume that features are binary classifi-
ers (or have a finite number of values) . If the analysis is extended to features that 
have a dimensional structure, the position gets closer to the theory of frames and 
to the theory presented here. However, the theory of dimensional spaces still con-
tains stronger assumptions about the underlying geometric structure, in particu-
lar on the integration and separability of dimensions and on the emphasis on 
concepts being convex regions (Gardenfors 2000). 
In this section, we have shown how results from cognitive psychology sup-
port the thesis that basic domains are dimensional. We next want to show that 
what have been called configurational domains can likewise be given a dimen-
sional analysis, as "higher-level" domains. 
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5 Configurations are higher-level domains 
5.1 Properties vs. concepts 
Following Gardenfors (2000), we will define a conceptual space as a set of dimen-
sions that are sorted into domains of integral dimensions. The dimensions repre-
sent perceived similarity: the closer two points are within a space, the more simi-
lar they are judged to be. 
This general description can be used to distinguish between properties and 
concepts. The following criterion was proposed in Gardenfors (1990, 2000), 
whereby the geometrical characteristics of the quality dimensions are used to in-
troduce a spatial structure to properties: 
A property is a convex region in some domain. 9 
The motivation for this criterion is that, if two objects - located at x and yin rela-
tion to certain quality dimension(s) - are both examples of a concept, then any 
object that is located between x and y with respect to the same quality dimen-
sion(s) will also be an example of that concept. 
As defined here, properties form a special case of concepts. While a property 
is based on a single domain, a concept is based on one or more domains (Garden-
fors 2000). Both linguistic and philosophical accounts have obliterated this dis-
tinction: for example, both properties and concepts are represented by predicates 
in first-order logic and in A-calculus. 
An example of a concept that is represented in several domains is bird (cf. 
Clausner and Croft 1999: 7). A bird has a shape, a size, a color, a weight, a distinc-
tive sound, an ecological habitat, etc. Langacker (1987: 152) calls the set of do-
mains used to characterize a concept the domain matrix. The set of domains for a 
concept need not be closed, but rather can be expanded as more knowledge is 
accrued. This is part of what Langacker (1987: 154) calls the encyclopedic concep-
tion of linguistic semantics. 
Whenever several domains are involved in a representation, one must assume 
some principle for how the different domains are to be weighed together. In addi-
tion to the domains in a concept's domain matrix, one must include information 
9 That a region R is convex means that, for any two points x and yin R, all points between x and 
y are also in R. We assume that the notion of betweenness is defined for all domains in a 
conceptual space, even though not all the domains may have a metric. This makes it possible to 
apply the criterion. 
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about the prominence of each domain. Langacker (1987: 165) calls a domain that 
is highly ranked a primary domain. He illustrates what he means by considering 
the difference in meaning between roe and caviar. The two concepts refer to the 
same entity: masses of fish eggs. However, with roe, the zoological domain of fish 
is prominent; while for caviar, the food domain is most prominent.1° Note that the 
relative weight of domains depends on the context in which a concept is used. If 
you are eating an apple, its taste will be more salient than if you are using the 
same apple as a ball while playing with an infant - in which case, the shape 
domain is most prominent. 
5.2 Higher-level domains11 
Next, we want to show that configurational concepts can also be analyzed in 
terms of dimensional domains. Certain properties can be described as more gen-
eral patterns arising from relations between points in a conceptual space. In an 
ordinary two-dimensional space (R2) with standard Euclidean metric, one can, of 
course, define regions as subsets of the space. One can also introduce a new 
space of "shapes" that are patterns of points in the space. Consider the concept 
rectangle: a typical configurational concept, according to Langacker. It can be 
defined using the set of all quadruples <a, b, c, d> of points in R2 satisfying the 
condition that the lines ab, be, cd, and ad form a convex polygon, with ax - bx= 
ex - dx and ay - cy = by - dy (i.e., the sides are pairwise equally long) and ladl = 
lbcl, where lad I and lbcl denote the length of the diagonals (i.e., the diagonals are 
equally long). One can partition this set of quadruples into equivalence classes 
by saying that two rectangles <a, b, c, d> and <e, f, g, h> are identical if lab I = lefl 
and lacl = legl. In this way, one identifies a rectangle by the length of its sides, 
independent of its position in R2.12 Now, let Ebe the set of all such equivalence 
classes. 13 This amounts to mapping the rectangle <a, b, c, d> to the point (labl, 
lacl) in R2 (see Figure 1). The space E of rectangles is therefore isomorphic to (R+ )2, 
with the width and the length of the rectangles as the generating dimensions. 
Within E, one can now identify regions that correspond to certain properties. 
For example, a square is any point <labl , lcdl> in E such that labl = lacl. It is easy 
10 Croft and Cruse (2004: 18) discuss a similar example concerning the difference between land 
and ground. 
11 This section builds on (Gii.rdenfors 2000), Section 3.10. 
12 The rectangles have the same shape if labl/lacl = lefl/[egl: i.e., if the quotients of the lengths 
of the sides are the same. 
13 On E, one can define a metric d, by d( <a, b, c, d>, <e, f, g , h>) = ,l([labl - leflF + [iacl - legl]2). 
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Fig. 1: The configurational space E of rectangles. 
to show that this region is a convex subset of E, since that subset corresponds in 
E to the line x = y, and a line is a convex set. On the right side of the line - i.e., 
where y > x - one finds the set of all rectangles taller than they are wide: e.g., the 
rectangle <l, 2> in Figure 2. This set is also convex. 
This analysis of the concept of rectangle is an elementary example how con-
figurations (patterns) can be defined as higher-order correlations in an underly-
ing space. 
x Fig. 2: The space of "vertica lly" extended rectangles. 
5.3 Shapes and other configurations 
Next, we discuss further examples of configurational concepts. Our arguments 
concerning the concept of rectangle can, in principle, be generalized to other 
shape concepts - though the technicalities may be intricate. 
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If something like Marr and Nishihara's (1978) analysis is adopted, one begins 
to see how such a space might appear. Their scheme for describing biological 
shapes uses cylinder-like modeling primitives. Each cylinder can be described by 
two coordinates: length and width. If one wants, one can add further dimensions 
describing the spatial orientation of the cylinder: e.g., horizontal or vertical. 14 
The details are not important in the present context. It is worth noting that - fol-
lowing Marr and Nishihara's model - an object can be described by a compara-
tively small number of coordinates, based on lengths and angles. In this way, an 
object can be represented as a pattern (vector) in a high-dimensional space; and 
the shape space is supervenient on the spatial and angular dimensions, just like 
rectangles are supervenient on the length and width dimensions. The superve-
nience relation introduces a partial hierarchy of domains that should be consid-
ered in any lexical analysis of concepts. 
Take an example from another type of domain: Clausner and Croft (1999: 9) 
argue that intervals and chords - on the pitch dimension - are configurational 
concepts. A similar analysis to that of the rectangles above can easily be devel-
oped for interval and chord. However, we will not pursue the details here. 
Another example is the domain of kinship relations, generated by combining 
links of the type "xis a child of y", "xis a parent of y", "xis married toy", "xis a 
sister or brother of y" to generate a genealogical tree structure. The partitioning of 
that tree generated by kinship words varies widely between languages: e.g., many 
cultures make no distinction between mother and (maternal) aunt. 
A genealogical tree is not the only way to represent kinship relations. Zwarts 
(2008) proposes a two-dimensional representation of kinship relations. One di-
mension is the number of steps backwards through the genealogy - represented 
by the horizontal dimension in Figure 3; the other is the number of steps forwards 
- represented by the vertical dimension. 
0 '1 2 3 
0 molher gra11dmother great-grandmother 
daughter slster aunt (grand)aunt 
2 gra11<klaugt\ter ni&ee cousln cousin 
3 great.granddaughter grandniece' cousin cousin 
Fig. 3: Diagram based on Zwarts' two-dimensional space of kinship relations (only one gender 
represented). 
14 Cylinders are combined by determining the angle between the dominating cylinder and the 
added one, as well as the position of the added cylinder relative to the dominating one. 
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Note that - in accordance with the property criterion - this representation 
makes cousin correspond to a convex region, unlike what happens if one rep-
resents the concept in a genealogical tree. In this way, one sees that, depending 
on which representation is used, concepts are differently related. 
Gardenfors (2007) and Gardenfors and Warglien (To appear) extend the di-
mensional analysis to representation of actions. When one perceives an action, 
one does not just see the movement, but also the forces that control the different 
kinds of motion. Clearly, the force domain can be given a dimensional descrip-
tion. By adding forces representing actions, one obtains the basic tools for ana-
lyzing the dynamic properties of actions. For many actions, such as moving and 
lifting, a single force vector is sufficient; some, such as walking and swimming, 
involve a complex of forces. Therefore, we define an action more generally as a 
configuration of forces, since several force vectors interact. 
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GLOT11S =n~~nH 
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Fig. 4: Utterances of the four words 'p<En', 'b<En', 't<En' and '<En' as sequences of force vectors 
applied to five vocal organs. The horizontal axis in each diagram represents the time dimension 
(from http://www.haskins.yale.edu/research/ gestural.html [Accessed May 2011]). 
An example of this approach to actions comes from phonetics. Browman and 
Goldstein (1990) describe the act of uttering a word as a "score of gestures" where 
the gestures are performed, not by the hands, but by the five vocal organs of 
velum, tongue tip, tongue body, lips, and glottis (see figure 4 for some examples). 
They then describe the utterance of a word as a temporal sequence - a score - of 
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activation of these organs. Each activation is meant to be one of a limited number 
of types. Such a score can be re-described as a temporal pattern of force vectors. 
Browman and Goldstein's description of the patterns as "vocal gestures" under-
lines this analogy. 
Another example comes from analyses of the force patterns involved in differ-
ent kinds of walking (e.g. Giese and Lappe 2002; Wang et al. 2004). By mapping 
the forces exerted by the parts of the leg during different kinds of walking, the 
similarities between the types of walking can be measured. The configuration of 
forces determines how the walking is categorized. The fact that the meaning of 
walk is more similar to that of jog than that of jump can be explained by the fact 
that the force patterns representing walking are more similar to those for jogging 
than those for jumping. The similarities of action patterns also explain how 
sub-categorization is generated. For example, the force patterns corresponding to 
march, stride, strut, saunter, tread, etc., can all be seen as sub-regions of the force 
patterns that describe walk (for an example of patterns involved in different gaits, 
see Wang et al. 2004). In brief, the similarities of the configurational patterns 
predict many aspects of categorization of actions. Without the dimensional struc-
tures of actions and the model of concepts as regions in spaces, these aspects are 
difficult to explain. 
The upshot is that many higher-level domains can be given a dimensional 
analysis. An even stronger claim would be that this holds for all domains: basic 
and higher-level. However, such a claim can only be taken as programmatic: for 
many higher-level domains, such as shape space, it may be difficult to identify the 
relevant dimensional structure. 
We conclude that the distinction between configurational and non-configu-
rational uses of a domain is not needed for semantic analysis - let alone for 
making a distinction between configurational and non-configurational domains 
per se. Instead, we propose, (1) to distinguish between dimensional structures 
and meronomic configurations, and (2) to restrict the notion of domain to the di-
mensional structures. We believe that the distinction made by (1) will bring much 
more order to analyses in cognitive semantics. 
6 Metaphors and metonymies in light of the 
dimensional/meronomic distinction 
In this section, we show that the distinction between dimensional domains and 
meronomic relations generates a simple and natural way of understanding the 
difference between metaphors and metonymies. 
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6.1 Characterizing metaphors and metonymies 
On the basis of dimensional analysis, it is natural to say that a metaphor ex-
presses an identity in structure between different domains. A word representing a 
particular pattern in one domain can be used as a metaphor to express the same 
pattern in another domain. In his invariance principle, Lakoff (1993: 215) expresses 
a closely related position: "metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topol-
ogy (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consis-
tent with the inherent structure of the target domain''. In this way, one can 
account for how a metaphor transfers information from one conceptual domain 
to another. 
Metonymy's role is primarily referential. By picking out one specific aspect of 
an entity, it focuses attention on something salient to the situation, thereby help-
ing one's understanding of it. Classical types of metonymy include pars pro toto, 
where the focus is on a part of an object instead of the whole; and totum pro pars, 
where the focus is on something that contains an object as one part. The relevant 
parts and wholes need not just be spatial, but can be temporal as well. More ab-
stract meronomic relations of functional or causal nature also generate metony-
mies: e.g., in "Proust is tough to read", the author stands for the book he wrote; 
while in "Napoleon attacked Russia'', the highlight is Napoleon's function as 
leader of the army. (For an extensive list of different types of metonymies, see 
Peirsman and Geerarts 2006, Section 2.) 
Metonymic concepts allow one to conceptualize something by its relation to 
something else to which it is connected. In contrast to metaphor, metonymy is 
based not on the similarity between two domains but on meronomic relations 
within the same domain. Here we agree with Lakoff and Turner (1989: 103), who 
argue that - unlike metaphor - metonymy "involves only one conceptual domain. 
A metonymic mapping occurs within a single domain, not across domains" . (See 
also Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006: 271.) 
In summary, our thesis is: 
Metaphors refer to mappings between domains, metonymies to meronomic rela-
tions within domains. 
This thesis is, at large, compatible with much work on metaphors and metony-
mies in cognitive linguistics. One theory that comes close to ours - in content if 
not in terminology - is Croft's (2002). He starts out from the broad notion of 
domain in the Langacker tradition; but then, following (Langacker 1987: 152), he 
introduces a distinction between (base) domain and domain matrix. He writes: 
"the combination of domains simultaneously presupposed by a concept such as 
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[HUMAN BEING] [is] called a domain matrix" (2003: 168). In line with our pro-
posal, he describes metaphors as domain mappings (2003: 177). He then argues 
that metonymy is based on (what he calls) domain highlighting, involving a shift 
from the foregrounding or highlighting of something in the primary domain of a 
concept, to the foregrounding or highlighting of it in a secondary domain within 
the same domain matrix (Croft 2002: 179). On the surface, this characterization 
differs from our notion of metonymy; but the result of Croft's analysis is basically 
the same as ours. That said, we believe that the contrast between dimensional 
domain mappings and meronomic relations makes the difference between the 
functions of metaphors and metonymies clearer. 
6.2 The contiguity theory of metonymy 
There are, however, accounts of metonymies that are based on a different tradi-
tion. One issue is whether all types of metonymy can be explained by a single 
cognitive mechanism: Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006) argue the implausibility of 
any unitary theory being able to do so. Before cognitive linguistics introduced the 
notions of domain and domain matrix, contiguity was the standard explanation 
for metonymy. Peirsman and Geeraerts consider whether contiguity might serve 
as an alternative to the mapping theory of cognitive linguistics. Given that conti-
guity suffers from the same vagueness as the notion of domain, they make an 
important addition to its traditional definition, arguing that any theory of conti-
guity be prototype based. Their definition of contiguity is conceptual in nature; 
they regard metonymy as something that is not objectively given, but rather the 
result of different construal operations. 
Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006) define spatial part/whole contiguity as the 
prototype for the category. Of course, this is the most typical meronomic relation; 
thus far, their proposal agrees with ours. They argue that, on the next level of 
typicality, one finds container/contained relations such as "Oscar drank a glass 
too many" and "the milk tipped over". Next are location/located relations such as 
"the whole house woke up" or the use of "billiards" for "a room where billiards is 
played." The people who wake up are not parts of the house; rather, their loca-
tions are parts of the house's location. In this weaker sense, container/contained 
and location/located relations can be seen as meronomic relations - again, in 
accordance with our thesis. According to Peirsman and Geeraerts, the least typi-
cal form of spatial metonymy is adjacency: e.g., the use of "old wig" to mean "old 
person." 
Peirsman and Geeraerts extend this prototypicality analysis to other do-
mains, including (i) temporal domains; (ii) events, processes, and actions; and 
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(iii) assemblies and collections: e.g., temporal part/whole relations correspond to 
spatial part/whole relations and constitute the prototypical core of metonymical 
relations in the temporal domain. Meanwhile, rather than being predominantly 
temporal or spatial in nature, assemblies are structured entities with different 
functional parts. Peirsman and Geeraerts argue that, for all of these domains, the 
core can be extended - both along the strength of contact dimension and what 
they call the boundedness dimension. 
In summary, Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006) propose that metonymy be 
explained by a prototype-based notion of contiguity. With the possible exception 
of adjacency, all of the cases of contiguity they analyze can be considered to be 
meronomic relations. 15 One finds little conflict between their approach and ours. 
The main difference is their focus on how metonymies can be more or less 
prototypical. 
7 Conclusion 
As it has been used in cognitive linguistics, the concept of domain seems to cover 
several distinct phenomena. Our aim has been to clear up that usage by distin-
guishing dimensional structures from meronomic relations. We believe this dis-
tinction provides useful tools for analysis of lexical semantics. 
Apart from the obvious relevance for lexical semantics, these two types of 
information structure are important for work on the Semantic Web (Berners-Lee 
et al. 2001). The dream of the Semantic Web is to develop a knowledge formalism 
covering everything that exists on the Web. That said, the "ontologies" that have 
been developed and expressed so far in various formal languages, such as OWL, 
mainly provide mereological information ("has a" relations) and logical notation 
for concept hierarchies ("is a" relations). Gardenfors (2004) argues that what is 
needed to make the Semantic Web more semantic is to include information about 
the similarity of concepts. We believe this is best done by including in the knowl-
edge formalisms information about the domains and their underlying dimen-
sions. One such attempt is the Conceptual Space Markup Language (CSML) pro-
posed by Adams and Raubal (2009). In summary, by combining the domain and 
image-schema analysis of cognitive semantics with more logically oriented repre-
sentations, the Semantic Web project will have a better chance to achieve a result 
that is truly semantic in nature. 
15 Their examples of spatial adjacency - such as "old wig" - could possibly be analyzed as 
meronornic relations within a functional or other domain. 
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